Congressional Staff

The Budgetary Process

American Politics:
©Marc A. Triebwasser

As can be seen from the number and variety of standing committees in both the House and the Senate, Congress has a number of responsibilities in addition to that of drafting legislation. These powers are spelled out in Article I of the Constitution which generally assumes that it would be Congress which would develop public policy and the Executive Branch which would carry out such policy. Most of the powers of Congress thus involve a relationship between the Legislative and Executive branches of our national government.

The Senate, for example, has the power of advice and consent on cabinet, ambassadorial and judicial appointments, as well as on appointments to other major federal positions. In other words, the Senate must approve these presidential appointments. In addition to this, the Senate must ratify by a two-thirds vote any treaty entered into by the President. Furthermore, approval by both the Senate and the House is required for a formal declaration of war.

Thus, in the major areas of diplomacy and military affairs, Congress was envisioned by the Constitution as playing a major role in partnership with the President. Over the more than 200-year history of national government, practices have developed, however, through which the President has been able to get a leading edge with regard to many of these matters.

Foreign and Military Affairs

In the area of foreign and military affairs, the President has generally used three major devices to get around some of the limitations placed on this office by the Constitution: executive agreements, undeclared wars, and secrecy.

Executive Agreements. Instead of entering into a treaty with a foreign government which would have to be approved by the Senate, in many instances the President will enter into an executive agreement with the leaders of a foreign nation. The details of these agreements--which do not have to be approved by the Senate--are often secret, and the Senate is often not informed of their full details. Although these agreements do not have quite the force of a treaty, they are usually politically binding on the United States--especially during the term of that particular president--and can thus often easily be substituted for treaties. Through the use of executive agreements, therefore, presidents have been able to conduct much of America's foreign policy without the check of ratification by the United States Senate.

Undeclared Wars. Although the Constitution states that Congress must declare a state of war, such a declaration has not been necessary for the actual conduct of military activities. The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has up until recently had the power to order the use of American troops anywhere in the world, without the necessity of congressional approval. Thus, the Vietnam conflict was never officially declared a war by Congress. Although Congress had indeed passed certain resolutions and had supported military appropriations for this military effort, it never actually made a formal declaration of war. Moreover had such a formal declaration been requested of Congress, it is highly unlikely that one would have been forthcoming.

In order to avoid occurrences similar to the Vietnam War, Congress passed a law in the 1970s called The War Powers Act which significantly limited the power of the President to use American troops in undeclared wars. According to this piece of legislation, a President must notify Congress prior to the use of American military personnel in any combat situation abroad. In addition, congressional approval is necessary to keep American troops stationed in such situations beyond 60 days. Through the use of this act, Congress hoped to regain some measure of control over American military affairs.

When President Carter used American military personnel in the ill-fated attempt to rescue the American hostages being held in Iran, a serious question was raised as to whether he had violated the War Powers Act by not informing Congress prior to carrying out these activities. Carter's argument was that the operation in Iran was a rescue attempt, rather than a combat activity, and that therefore this operation did not fall within the jurisdiction of the War Powers Act. There still remains, however, much debate over this matter. And even though President Carter was politically able to surmount these objections, the outcry raised by Congress over this mission made succeeding presidents very hesitant to engage in similar activities.

Secrecy. To be effective much of our foreign and military policies must be kept secret from other governments. In order to achieve such secrecy, many aspects of our military and foreign affairs are therefore kept secret from the American people as well. To an extent this is necessary. Although it is proper for the government to maintain military and foreign relations secrets, it is not constitutionally proper for the Executive Branch to keep these matters secret from the proper authorities in the Legislative Branch.

Despite this, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have often been kept in the dark about certain matters relating to foreign policy--or they have been advised in a , shall we say, less than fully truthful manner. One of the most blatant instances of this lack of information or of false information being transmitted to Congress involved a hearing in which President Johnson's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, participated in order to get Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. And it was this Resolution, passed on the basis of false and incomplete information, which President Johnson and later President Nixon used to suggest that Congress had voted to support the Vietnam War.

In many instances, the use of secrecy between the Executive and the Legislative branches is not so much a matter of policy as a matter of each particular institution, department, or committee wanting to maintain as much authority as possible, and of each institution being extremely jealous with regard to their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, this restricted flow of information certainly affects important matters in the formation of our nation's foreign and military policies and is not the sort of process envisioned in the Constitution.

Domestic Affairs

Thus far, we have been discussing matters involving foreign and military affairs. In general the Constitution did not go into much detail in these areas. After all, George Washington in his farewell military address had warned against the United States becoming involved in "foreign entanglements." Since those present at the Constitutional Convention operated very much with the idea that George Washington would serve as the first President under the Constitution, they tended to view his ideas very seriously. It is therefore understandable that presidents--both as Head of State and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces--would be able to gather to themselves and their staff large amounts of power relative to that of Congress in the areas of foreign and military affairs.

On the domestic front, however, the Constitution was far more specific. And up until the middle of the twentieth century, congress was able to maintain a great deal of power in domestic affairs. Over the years, there has been one practice by which Presidents have been able to take over--some would go so far as to say, usurp---some of the powers of Congress in domestic affairs.

Impoundment. Although Congress is empowered to draft legislation establishing programs through authorization bills and to fund them through appropriations bills, it is up to the President to administer these programs and to order the spending of appropriated funds. In some instances a president may order certain funds appropriated by Congress not to be spent. This practice is known as impoundment.

Usually this procedure involves minor administrative decisions most often engaged in for practical purposes not foreseen by Congress. In addition, this practice has usually involved only small sums of money. When engaged in to a limited extent, impoundment usually does not dramatically affect legislative-executive relations. However, it is obvious that if a president decides not to spend appropriated monies to any large extent in any specific area, he or she may well destroy a particular program which Congress wishes to see carried out.

President Nixon's use of the impoundment of funds constituted just such a threat in the balance between the power of the Executive and Legislative branches. He used his impoundment authority quite widely, impounding a record amount of forty million dollars in funds in a single year. What is more, he used these impoundment powers in a very systematic manner, tending to starve out social welfare programs--many of which were being administered specifically by Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and by Housing and Urban Development (HUD). President Nixon's use of his impoundment authority, therefore, constituted a deliberate attempt on the part of a president to modify American public policy and to establish priorities quite different from those voted by Congress. Such use of presidential authority so angered many representatives and senators that in 1974 they passed an act designed to limit substantially the authority of the President to impound funds. This Act, the Federal Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, had many other important provisions in addition to those involving impoundment, as we shall see.

While Congress acted in several ways in the 1970s to counter the power shift to the President, it did little before that and has done little since. In general, Congress is not usually well enough coordinated to counter some of the power thrusts of twentieth century presidents.
 
 

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